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ABSTRACT
Tunneling through related party transactions is one of the most challenging aspects in corporate governance. In 
addition, the impact of tunneling activities may affect to corporate governance’s performance in most of Asian countries. 
Yet, studies on the effectiveness of corporate governance in relation to tunneling are still limited and the results have 
been inconclusive. This study tries to develop a detection model to distinguish related party transactions that can be 
categorised as tunneling activities. Furthermore, this study also examines whether corporate governance mechanisms can 
explain the tunneling activities. The main findings of this study suggest that companies, in Indonesian listed companies, 
with concentrated ownerships have a greater tendency to conduct tunneling transactions compared to companies with 
dispersed ownerships, and the overall corporate governance mechanisms implemented by the companies could not be 
used as predictors for tunneling behaviour.
Keywords: Tunneling; corporate governance; related party transactions; asset tunneling; quality and performance 
improvement; Indonesian listed companies
ABSTRAK
Terowong melalui urus niaga dengan pihak berkaitan adalah salah satu aspek yang paling mencabar dalam tadbir 
urus korporat. Di samping itu, kesan aktiviti terowong boleh menjejaskan prestasi tadbir urus korporat di kebanyakan 
negara-negara Asia. Namun, kajian mengenai keberkesanan tadbir urus korporat berhubung dengan terowong adalah 
masih terhad dan keputusan belum meyakinkan. Kajian ini cuba untuk membangunkan model pengesanan untuk 
membezakan urus niaga pihak berkaitan yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai aktiviti terowong. Tambahan pula, kajian 
ini juga mengkaji sama ada mekanisme tadbir urus korporat tersebut dapat menjelaskan aktiviti terowong yang berlaku. 
Penemuan utama kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa syarikat-syarikat, iaitu syarikat Indonesia yang tersenarai, dengan 
pemilikan berpusat mempunyai kecenderungan yang lebih besar untuk menjalankan urus niaga terowong berbanding 
syarikat yang mempunyai pemilikan terpencar, dan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat yang menyeluruh dilaksanakan oleh 
syarikat-syarikat tidak boleh digunakan sebagai peramal bagi kelakuan terowong.
Kata kunci: Model terowong; tadbir urus korporat; urus niaga pihak berkaitan; terowong aset; kualiti dan peningkatan 
prestasi; syarikat tersenarai Indonesia
INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in the issue of Related 
Party Transactions (RPTs) in recent years. RPT issues are 
considered critical in developing countries that have the 
characteristics of low levels of investor protection, law 
enforcement and group structure. Lack of disclosure of 
RPTs and low investor protection in these countries have 
made it difficult for users of financial statements to assess 
whether a certain transaction was made for economic, 
earning management, or tunneling purposes. Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) define 
tunneling as transferring of resources out of a company 
for the benefit of its controlling shareholders. Bae, Kang 
and Kim (2002) describe that tunneling practices could 
range from outright theft or fraud to dilutive share issues 
which discriminate against minority shareholders. There 
is plenty of empirical evidence of companies using RPTs 
for tunneling purposes. 
So far, studies that focus on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in relation to tunneling are still very 
limited and the results have been inconclusive. Gao and 
Kling (2008), Lo, Wong and Firth (2010), Yeh, Shu and Su 
(2012) and Haβ, Johan and MÜller (2016), for examples, 
found that overall corporate governance practices could 
prevent tunneling activities, whereas Cheung, Jing, Lu, 
Rau and Stouratis (2009a), Li (2010), Juliarto, Tower, 
Van der Zahn and Rusmin (2013), and Shan (2013) found 
that the overall corporate governance variables could not 
explain the corporate behaviour in relation to tunneling. 
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One of the obstacles in studying tunneling activities 
is finding an accurate method of measuring them. It is not 
surprising that most previous studies of tunneling focused 
on the evaluation of market reaction at the time of the 
announcements of RPTs (Facio & Stolin 2006; Peng, Wei 
& Yang 2011) or used the level of RPTs as a proxy for 
tunneling (Gao & Kling 2008; Juliarto et al. 2013). 
Research in Indonesia to assess whether related party 
transcation used for efficient or opportunistic reasons also 
using stock market reactions (Utama & Utama 2009; 
Utama, Utama & Yuniasih 2010). This study to fill the gap, 
with the design tunneling detection criteria which not only 
based on the market’s reaction but also the characteristics 
of the transaction and company. In addition, there have 
been some indications that some companies in Indonesia 
have performed tunneling activities (e.g. Juliarto et al. 
2013), including those which were considered as fair 
trusted companies based on the corporate governance 
perception index (Sari 2013). These have led to a serious 
question about the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practice in Indonesia in preventing tunneling activities. 
Taking the above discussion on board, this study tries 
to develop a detection model to distinguish RPTs that can 
be categorised as tunneling activities, and to examine 
whether corporate governance mechanisms can explain 
the tunneling activities in Indonesian listed companies. 
In this study, the tunneling detection model is developed 
based on market reactions at the time of announcements of 
RPTs and some characteristics of RPTs, such as indications 
that a transaction to related parties is made for tunneling 
purposes, similarities between the controlling shareholders 
of the two parties, and differences of cash flow rights 
between the controlling shareholders of the two parties. 
The findings are expected to provide insights into the role 
of corporate governance in deterring tunneling activities 
within the context of emerging markets.
CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION AND RESEARCH 
PROPOSITION
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (RPTS) 
AND TUNNELING
There are three common reasons for companies to conduct 
RPTs. Firstly, RPTs are used by companies for the purpose 
of minimising transaction costs (Cook 1977; Fisman & 
Khanna 1998). This is a legitimate usage of RPTs based on 
economic motives. Secondly, RPTs are used by companies 
to manipulate earnings (Aharony, Wang & Yuan 2009; Jian 
& Wong 2003), and thirdly, RPTs are used for the purpose 
of tunneling (Berkman, Cole & Fu 2009; Cheung et al. 
2009a). These second and third reasons are prompted by 
opportunistic motives. 
In the case of RPTs that are used for the tunneling 
purpose, some studies have found various ways for 
resources to be tunnelled by companies. Aharony et al. 
(2009), Jian and Wong (2003), for example, found that 
companies used receivables to related parties as a tunnel 
to transfer resources out of the companies. Berkman et al. 
(2009) and Jia, Shi and Wang (2013) analysed companies 
that issued loan guarantees to their related parties, which in 
effect expropriated wealth from the minority shareholders. 
Cheung, Qi, Rau and Stouraitis (2009b) found empirical 
evidence that the sale and purchase of assets to related 
parties were used to perform asset tunneling.
Tunneling activities are often difficult to identify 
since the activities are made and hidden within the 
seemingly legitimate transactions. However, the process 
for substantiating tunneling activities requires utilisation 
of some relevant indicators, and, so far, there is a lack of an 
instrument that could be used for this purpose. While some 
studies have used the level of RPTs to measure tunneling 
(Gao & Kling 2008; Juliarto et al. 2013). Taking the above 
discussions on board, this study tries to develop a detection 
model that includes a number of key ‘red flags’ that can 
be used to indicate tunneling when examining a related 
party transaction made by a company.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TUNNELING
Principle good corporate governance mechanisms are 
useful in protecting the interests of minority shareholders 
by preventing opportunistic behaviours made by the 
controlling shareholders. Lins and Warnock (2004) 
described two common corporate governance mechanisms 
that companies can use: internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. Internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, which consist of control structure and 
corporate structure. External corporate governance 
mechanisms consist of the rule of law and market of 
corporate control. It has been suggested that corporate 
governance practices may differ across different 
institutional contexts and different countries (e.g. 
Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima 2013). The focus of this 
study is on the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
in Indonesian listed companies.
In relation to control structure, previous studies have 
found that the proportion of independent members in the 
board has a negative correlation with transfer pricing 
manipulations (e.g. Chen, Firth, Gao & Rui 2006; Gao 
& Kling, 2008; Lo et al. 2010; Shan 2013), a positive 
correlation to financial performance (e.g. Brickley, Coles 
& Terry 1994; Byrd & Hickman 1992) and a negative 
impact on financial fraud (Beasley 1996; Dechow, Sloan 
& Sweeney 1996). These findings imply that independent 
board members could counterbalance the influence of the 
controlling shareholders, and accordingly lead to better 
corporate governance practice. This perception has also 
been shared by some security exchanges. Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) for example, recommends any company 
listed on IDX to have at least 30% independent members 
on its board. 
Furthermore, evidence has indicated that audit 
committees which had members with financial and 
industry backgrounds and expertise were more likely to 
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demand higher quality audits and reduce the chances for 
transfer pricing manipulations or asset appropriation (e.g. 
Abbott, Parker, Peters & Raghunandan 2003; Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal & Relay 2002; Gao & Kling 2008; Lo 
et al. 2010). Lary and Taylor (2012) found that stronger 
audit committee independence and competence were 
significantly related to a lower number of incidents and a 
lower level of severity of financial restatements, which led 
to companies producing more reliable financial statements. 
In Indonesia, any listed company on IDX is required to have 
an audit committee of at least three members - one of whom 
must be an independent commissioner of the company and 
acts as the chairman of the audit committee.
In addition to the key ownership, management 
ownership has been seen as a factor that could align the 
potential divergence of interests between management and 
the shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, 
some contrary arguments have suggested that the increased 
management ownership is not always able to improve the 
welfare of the shareholders as a whole. Managers in a 
company could increase the percentage of their holdings 
to a level that allowed them to dominate the board of 
directors, and thus isolate the interests of other parties in 
the internal and external control of the company (Fama 
& Jensen 1983; Gibson 2003; Santiago-Castro & Brown 
2011).
In the context of emerging markets, Gunarsih (2002), 
in her study, found that large domestic institutional 
investors tended to represent their own interests, while 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) found that foreign institutional 
investors provided better monitoring functions when 
interacting with the emerging markets in the global 
economy compared to domestic institutional investors. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) also found that corporate 
performance was positively related to foreign institutional 
owner ship and was negatively related to domestic 
institutional ownership.
In a company with a concentrated ownership 
structure, the controlling shareholder could control the 
company’s resources and implement policies that benefit 
them at the expense of the non-controlling shareholders 
(La Porta, LopeZ-de-Silanes & Shleifer 2000). Gomes and 
Novaes (2001) suggested that a concentrated ownership 
structure could facilitate asset expropriation in a company 
as the major shareholders could not only dominate the 
board of directors and the shareholders’ meetings, but 
also determine the company’s daily operation including 
influencing contractual policies with related parties and 
appointing their own candidate as the CEO (Shi & Shitu 
2004). 
This study takes aboard the overall conclusion from 
the above discussion, and develops a tentative proposition 
namely;
P1 There are significant differences between corporate 
governance structures of being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies
Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), Cheung et al. 
(2009b) and Jian and Wong (2003) found that there 
were many ways for companies to do tunneling. These 
include activities such as receivables to related party, 
asset transactions, trading transactions, cash payments 
and equity transactions to related parties. For example, 
a company can provide a huge amount of accounts 
receivable or a long credit period or loans to a related 
party. A receivable given to a related party can be treated 
as a put option, in which a related party can exercise such 
an option by not paying the receivable in a bad situation 
(Atanasov, Black & Ciccotelo 2008). Provision and 
elimination of related party loans will in effect decrease 
a company’s net earnings.
Transfer pricing for related-party transactions 
should be set according to market prices as used in arm’s 
length transactions (OECD 2001). However, in practice, 
management can use transfer pricing as a mechanism 
to transfer profits among related companies in order to 
reduce tax, increase management bonuses, and channel 
resources from one firm in a group of companies to another 
firm in the group or to the owner. Tunneling could also 
be made through unfair transfer pricing transactions, in 
which a company sold assets to related parties at a lower 
price than the normal independent party transaction price 
or purchased assets from related parties at a higher price 
than the independent transaction prices (Cheung et al. 
2009b; Lo et al. 2010). Hosseinyan, Hashim and Isa (2016) 
found that sales or purchases of good through RPTs have 
a significantly negative relationship with firm value. Lo 
et al. (2010) found that tunneling through unfair transfer 
pricing decrease being-tunneled profit. Bertrand, Mehta 
and Mullainathan (2002) and Cheung et al. (2006), in their 
studies, found that being-tunnelled companies experienced 
decreased performance, while the tunneling companies 
experienced increased performance. Therefore, this study 
adds another proposition as follows:
P2 There are significant differences in financial 
performances between being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies.
METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION
This study aims to evaluate the differences between 
corporate governance structures of being-tunnelled and 
not-tunnelled companies that were listed in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX). Therefore, the sample used in this 
study was collected using a two-step process to allow a 
representative sample for both being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies. The process will be discussed in the 
following two sub-sections.
The observation periods applied in this study were 
from 2009-2011. The reason for the period chosen was 
2009 is a year after the world economic crisis in 2008. 
The following period in Indonesia, in 2011, changes in 
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financial sector reform. The government and the House of 
Representatives (DPR) agreed to set up Financial Services 
Authority (FSA or so called OJK) on 22 November 2012. 
The FSA is an independent institute with to take over the 
functions, duties and authority setting has been done by the 
Ministry of Finance through Capital Market Supervisory 
Agency and Financial Institution (Bapepam-LK). 
Therefore, the period prior to 2009 - 2011 for regulations 
on related party transactions in Indonesia are still using 
by Bapepam-LK. Under Regulation No.1X.E.1 2009, 
Bapepam-LK governing affiliated transactions and conflict 
of interests. However, after the year 2012 regulating 
agencies are no longer Bapepam instead of FSA. 
The lists of the companies were collected from the 
IDX Fact Books 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Indonesia Stock 
Exchange 2009, 2010, 2011). There were nine industry 
classifications of listed companies on the IDX. In this 
study, Finance classified companies that were listed on the 
IDX during 2009 to 2011 were excluded since they were 
subject to specific financial sector regulations, and hence 
were not attuned to the other companies in the other eight 
classifications (i.e. Agriculture; Mining; Basic Industry 
and Chemicals; Miscellaneous Industry; Consumer 
Goods Industry; Property, Real Estate and Building 
Construction; Infrastructure, Utilities and Transportation; 
Trade, Services and Investment). There were 399, 407, 428 
companies listed on the IDX during 2009, 2010, and 2011 
respectively. After the exclusion of the Finance classified 
companies, the remaining listed companies, which were 
used in this study, were 332, 338, 357 during 2009, 2010, 
2011 respectively.
DATA COLLECTION: TUNNELING DETECTION CRITERIA
The first data collection step was applied in this study to 
gather a sample of being-tunnelled companies. For this 
purpose, this study searched and reviewed announcements 
made by the listed companies on the IDX websites and/
or on their companies’ websites, including information 
regarding affiliate and conflict of interest transactions. For 
each transaction, its detailed information were evaluated, 
including the object of the transaction, the transaction 
value, the transaction date, the announcement date, the 
description of the relationships with the party’s affiliation, 
and the report from the assessor’s office about the fairness 
of the transaction. To identify the abnormal return around 
the announcements of RPTs, this study used use daily 
stock returns from Data Real-time Investment (RTI) from 
Universitas Gadjah Mada Database. 
TUNNELLING 
DETECTION 
CRITERIA
Negative abnormal 
return around the 
announcement of a 
related party transaction
Differences of 
cash flow rights 
of controlling 
shareholders in a 
company and its 
related party
Indications that a 
transaction to related 
parties is made for 
tunneling purposes
Overlapping ownerships 
between a company 
and its related party
FIGURE 1. Tunneling detection criteria: Classification as tunneling by meet all four criteria
To determine whether a certain RPT can be classified 
as tunneling, some findings from previous studies were 
utilised as bases for developing the detection criteria. 
Figure 1 describes the criteria and their literature sources. 
A related party transaction could be classified as tunneling; 
if it met all of these four criteria (refer to Appendix A for 
criteria’s description and literature sources).
DATA COLLECTION: NOT-TUNNELLED DETECTION 
CRITERIA
Accordingly, the second data collection step was applied in 
this study to gather a sample of not-tunnelled companies. 
In this second data collection step, in addition to the 
Finance classified companies, being-tunnelled companies 
that were found in the first data collection step were also 
excluded from the lists of the companies listed on the IDX 
during 2009, 2010 and 2011. Subsequently, the following 
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FIGURE 2. Not-tunnelled detection criteria: Classification as not-tunnelled by meet all three criteria
Not-Tunneled 
Detection 
Criteria
A listed 
company on 
the IDX has a 
posotive net 
income
The ratio of related 
party accounts 
receivable transactions 
made by a listed 
company is less than 
the average related 
party accounts 
receivable transactions 
made by all listed 
companies on the IDX
The ratio of related 
party trading made by 
a listed company is 
less than the average 
ratio of all related party 
trading made by all 
listed companies on 
the IDX
criteria were used to obtain the sample for not-tunnelled 
companies. A company could be classified as not-tunnelled 
if it met all of these three criteria as refer to Figure 2.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT WITH LOGISTIC ANALYSIS
In testing the propositions, this study employed Logistic 
Regression Analysis (Diekhoff 1992) and the data were 
analysed using Statistical Package for Social Science 
(SPSS) software. Logistic regression is used to analyse 
a dataset in which there are one or more independent 
variables that determine an outcome. The outcome is 
measured with a dichotomous variable which are only two 
possible outcomes. In logistic regression, the dependent 
variable is dichotomous for only contains data coded as 
1 (TRUE, and etc.) or 0 (FALSE, and etc.).
Furthermore, dependent variable for this study are 
1 is ‘Assigned for a Being-Tunnelled Company’ and 
0 is ‘Assigned for a Not-Tunnelled Company’. Moreover, 
the goal of logistic regression is to find the best fitting 
model to describe the relationship between the dependent 
variable or outcome variable and a set of independent or 
explanatory variables. The initial model to be tested in 
this study is constructed as follows:
Tunnelling = β0 + β1Single Shareholder + β2Multiple 
Shareholders + β3Independent Board 
+ β
4
 Audit Committee + β
5
Managerial 
Ownership + β
6
Foreign Institutional 
Ownership + β7Domestic Institutional 
Ownership + β
8
State Ownership + 
β9ROA + β10PM + εi        (1) 
Explanatory variables for the tunneling model 
development as presented in Figure 3. In addition, detailed 
model is constructed and summarised in Appendix B. The 
results for this study are provided in the next section.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
BEING-TUNNELLED AND NOT-TUNNELLED COMPANIES
Analysis made for the period of 2009 to 2011on the IDX 
websites and on the listed companies’ websites found 
announcements of affiliation and conflict of interest 
transactions made or related to 74 companies. Assessments 
based on the tunneling detection criteria showed 55 
transactions which were indicated as asset tunneling 
transactions, 3 transactions which were indicated as equity 
tunneling transactions and 16 transactions which appeared 
to be propping transactions. Propping transactions are 
transactions that are seemingly beneficial for minority 
shareholders, although their real benefits are difficult 
to judge since the nature of the transactions are often 
concealed.
This study focuses on asset tunneling, and therefore, 
55 being-tunnelled companies were included for 
further analysis. The detailed classifications of these 74 
transactions are described on Table 1. 
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A second analysis was conducted to obtain a sample 
for the not-tunnelled companies based on the not-
tunnelled detection criteria, and the result of the analysis 
found 87 not-tunnelled companies. The detailed industry 
classifications of these 55 being-tunnelled and 87 not-
tunnelled companies are described on Table 2.
THE MODEL DEVELOPMENT FOR TUNNELING DETECTION: 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS AND MODEL REVISION
To test the multi-collinearity aspect of the initial model, 
Pearson correlation analysis was conducted to examine the 
correlations among the independent variables. It was found 
that there were high correlations among the managerial 
ownership, foreign institutional ownership, domestic 
institutional ownership, and state ownership variables. Thus, 
this study constructed and used an Ownership Classification 
Index, which covers the four variables mentioned above. 
The value of this index was the sum of the dummy scores 
of the above four variables. For the managerial ownership 
variable, a dummy score of 1 was assigned when the level 
of managerial ownership of a company was lower than the 
median level of the population managerial ownership. For 
the foreign institutional ownership variable, a dummy score 
of 1 was assigned when the level of foreign institutional 
ownership of a company was higher than the median level 
of the population foreign institutional ownership. For the 
domestic institutional ownership variable, a dummy score 
of 1 was assigned when the level of domestic institutional 
Domestic 
Institutional 
Ownership
FIGURE 3. Explanatory variables in Tunneling Detection (Initial) Model
1 is assigned if one shareholder controls at least 50% 
of the total equity OR if one shareholder controls 
between 40% to 50% of the total equity and this 
ownership percentage is higher than the sum of the 
ownership percentages held by the second to the 
fifth largest shareholders
Net income to total asset
Percentage of shares held by domestic institutional 
investors
Percentage of shares held by all members the Board 
of Directors
0 is assigned otherwise
0 is assigned if the ownership structure is different 
than those for scale 1
1 is assigned if the proportion of independent board 
members is at least 30% of the total number of 
board members Independent 
Board
Managerial 
Ownership
Single 
Shareholder
Audit 
Committee
State 
Ownership
Foreign 
Institutional 
Ownership
Multiple 
Shareholder
ROA PM
Explanatory Variables in 
TUNNELLING 
DETECTION 
(INITIAL) MODEL
Tunnelling
0 is assigned for a not-tunnelled company
Net income to sales
1 is assigned if the largest shareholder holds 
between 10 to 50% of the total equity, the second 
largest shareholder holds at least 10% of the 
equity, and the ownership percentage of the 
largest shareholder is smaller than the sum of the 
ownership percentages held by the second to the 
fifth largest shareholders
1 is assigned if a company is ultimately owned 
by the state
Percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors
0 is assigned otherwise
0 is assigned if the ownership structure is 
different than those for scale 1
1 is assigned if the composition of the audit 
committee is in accordance with the regulation
0 is assigned otherwise
1 is assigned for a being-tunnelled company
TABLE 1. Results of the tunneling detection
Transaction Number of
  Announcements
Asset Tunneling :  
1 Elimination of receivables 9
2 Receivable transactions 10
3 Guarantee of receivables 8
4 Service payments 4
5 Leases 2
6 Purchase of assets  6
7 Sale of assets  16
Total  55
Equity Tunneling  3
Propping 16
Total  74
TABLE 2. Companies’ IDX industry classifications
IDX Industry Number of  Number of 
Classification  Being- Not-
 Tunnelled  Tunnelled
 Companies Companies
Agriculture 1 2
Mining  11 17
Basic Industry and Chemicals  12 19
Miscellaneous Industry  3 5
Consumer Goods Industry  14 22
Property, Real Estate and 1 1
Building Construction
Infrastructure, Utilities and 3 5
Transportation
Trade, Services and Investment 10 16
Total  55 87
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ownership of a company was lower than the median level 
of the population domestic institutional ownership. For the 
state ownership variable, a dummy score of 1 was assigned 
when the level of state ownership of a company was lower 
than the median level of the population state ownership.
The revised model is as follows.
Model 1:
Tunnelling = β0+β1Single Shareholder + β2Multiple 
Shareholders + β3Independent Board 
+ β
4
Audit Committee + β
5
Ownership 
Classification Index + β
6
ROA + β7PM  
+ εi                (2)
The correlation matrix based on this revised model 
is presented on Table 3.
To allow more results gained from the analysis, this 
study also constructed a Corporate Governance Index to 
represent the overall quality of the corporate governance 
practices. This followed the study of Yeh et al. (2012). The 
value of this corporate governance index was the sum of 
the dummy scores of the independent board and the audit 
committee variables, and the ownership classification 
index. Accordingly, the following model was also used 
in this study.
Model 2:
Tunnelling = β0 + β1Single Shareholder + β2Multiple 
Shareholders + β3Corporate Governance 
Index + β
4
ROA + β
5
PM + εi       (3)
TABLE 3. Correlation matrix of the independent variables in the revised model
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.  Ownership Classification Index 1      
2.  Return on Assets -.072 1     
3.  Profit Margin -.012 .529** 1    
4.  Independent Board  -.109 -.059 -.055 1   
5.  Audit Committee -.042 .070 .206* .111 1  
6.  Multiple Shareholders -.188* .071 -.069 .041 .011 1 
7.  Single Shareholder -.186* .019 -.168 .072 -.046 .594** 1
      
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS AND TUNNELING ACTIVITIES
To test Proposition 1 addressing the differences between 
corporate governance structures of being-tunnelled and 
not-tunnelled companies, this study employed logistic 
regression analysis on the two models. The results are 
presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4. Results of logistic regression analysis for tunneling 
detection model
  Model 1 Model 2
Single Shareholder 1.456** 1.505**
Multiple Shareholders -.583 -.423
Independent Board .172 
Audit Committee .438 
Ownership Classification Index -.101 
Corporate Governance Index  .115
Return on Assets -.046 -.040
Profit Margin -.249*** -.245***
R2  .594 .590
Percentage of Correct Classification 93.2 89.0
  
Notes:  ***significant at the 0.01 level
 ** significance at the 0.05 level
 * significance at the 0.10 level
DISCUSSIONS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF BEING-
TUNNELLED AND NOT-TUNNELLED COMPANIES: 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics for the companies based on the 
tunneling model used in this study are presented in 
Table 5 (kindly refer for detailed descriptive statistic at 
Appendix 1). 
The main finding from the descriptive statistics 
indicated that being-tunnelled companies had significantly 
higher level of managerial ownerships than not-tunnelled 
companies. This might indicate that the owners who served 
in the board of directors in being-tunnelled companies 
dominated the decision making process, and focused the 
decisions on their own interests as owners (Santiago-
Castro & Brown 2011).
The state ownership of being tunnelled companies 
was significantly higher than that of not-tunnelled 
companies. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang (2004) and Shan (2013), 
in which companies controlled by states are likely to 
suffer more from tunneling activities. The domestic 
institutional ownership of being tunnelled companies was 
slightly higher than that of not-tunnelled companies, while 
the foreign institutional ownership of being tunnelled 
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companies was similar to that of not-tunnelled companies. 
The values of the ownership concentrations (single and 
multiple shareholders), independent board and audit 
committee compositions of being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies looked similar. Finally, the financial 
performance (return on assets and profit margin) of being-
tunnelled companies was significantly lower compared 
to that of not-tunnelled companies. This confirmed the 
proposition that tunneling activities are likely to destroy 
the overall shareholders’ value. 
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS AND TUNNELING ACTIVITIES
The main finding that can be gained from the results is 
the significance of the single shareholder variable in both 
Models 1 and 2. The significance of the single shareholder 
variable clearly indicates that the IDX listed companies 
with concentrated ownerships have a tendency to conduct 
tunneling transactions, compared to those companies 
with dispersed ownerships. The multiple shareholders 
variable, however, is found to be an insignificant factor 
for predicting the tunneling behaviour of being-tunnelled 
and not-tunnelled companies.
The independent board and audit committee variables 
are found to be insignificant factors for predicting 
the tunneling behaviour of being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies. These findings are consistent with 
those reported by Juliarto et al. (2013) in their study on 
tunneling behaviour in South East Asian countries. It could 
be implied that the effectiveness of these two corporate 
governance elements in preventing tunneling activities 
within the IDX listed companies is questionable. 
The ownership classification index, in this study, 
is found to be an insignificant factor for tunneling 
behaviour. It could indicate that overall there are no 
differences in managerial ownership, foreign institutional 
ownership, domestic institutional ownership, and state 
ownership structures between the being-tunnelled and 
the not-tunnelled companies that were listed on the IDX. 
It could also indicate that the differences on the corporate 
structures between the being-tunnelled and the not-
tunnelled companies that were listed on the IDX could not 
be used as predictors for tunneling behaviour. This finding 
is consistent with that of Cheung et al.’s (2009a) study on 
publicly listed firms in Hong Kong which showed that 
the ownership structure variables could not explain the 
possibility for companies to conduct the value destroying 
RPTs. Similarly, the corporate governance index is found to 
be insignificant, and could imply that the overall corporate 
governance structures in the IDX listed companies have not 
been effective in preventing tunneling behaviour. 
In relation to Proposition 1, overall corporate 
governance mechanisms of being-tunnelled and not-
tunnelled companies listed on the IDX cannot be 
differentiated, or they cannot explain the tunneling 
behaviour made by these companies. Therefore, 
TABLE 5. Quality detection for the companies based on the tunneling model
Variable Quality Detection Description
  Tunnelled Not-Tunnelled
Managerial Ownership ↑	 ↓	 The owners who served in the board of directors in
    being-tunnelled companies dominated the decision
    making process, and focused the decisions on their
    own interests as owners.
State Ownership ↑	 ↓	 Companies controlled by states are likely to suffer
    more from tunneling activities
Domestic Institutional Ownership ↑	 ↓	 Companies controlled by domestic institutional are
    likely to suffer more from tunneling activities
Foreign Institutional Ownership = = Companies controlled by foreign institutional are
    likely similar from tunneling activities
Ownership Concentrations = = The values of the ownership concentrations
(Single & Multiple Shareholders)   compositions of being-tunnelled and not-tunnelled
    companies looked similar
Independent Board = = The values of the independent board compositions of
    being-tunnelled and not-tunnelled companies looked
    similar
Audit Committee = = The values of the audit committee compositions of
    being-tunnelled and not-tunnelled companies looked
    similar
Financial Performance (Return ↓	 ↑	 The financial performance of being-tunnelled 
on Assets & profit Margin)    companies was significantly lower compared to that
    of not-tunnelled companies
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Proposition 1 cannot be accepted inclusively. However, 
it can be partially accepted since the findings in this 
study show one corporate governance variable (i.e. single 
shareholder) which could be used to predict tunneling 
behaviour of being-tunnelled and not-tunnelled companies 
listed on the IDX. 
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCES AND TUNNELING ACTIVITIES
The results on Table 4 show that, while the return on assets 
variable is not significant, the profit margin variable is 
significant in both Models 1 to 2. The correlation sign 
suggests a decrease in profit margin when there is an 
indication of tunneling activities. This strongly suggests 
that the profitability factor is able to distinguish between 
being-tunnelled and not-tunnelled companies. This is 
consistent with the studies by Bertrand et al. (2002) 
and Cheung et al. (2006), which found that companies 
experienced decreasing profitability when they performed 
tunneling transactions. Accordingly, Proposition 2 is 
accepted.
IMPLICATIONS TO ACADEMIC AND MANAGEMENTS
The agency problem is one of the central issues in the 
financial literature. In companies with concentrated 
ownership, shareholders can control the management or 
even be part of the management itself. In addition, the 
agency problem that stands out in a company like this is 
a conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and 
non-controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders 
can expropriate the non-controlling shareholders in various 
ways. In addition, expropriation (expropriation) is the use 
of process control in order to maximize shareholder’s own 
welfare on the other side of wealth distribution (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan & Lang 2000). 
Furthermore, Gilson and Gordon (2003) identified 
two possible ways to do the controlling shareholders to 
obtain private benefits over the control of the company’s 
policy is through the company’s operations policies and 
contractual policies with other parties. Forms of private 
benefits that can be obtained through the company’s 
operating policies include high salaries and allowances, 
bonuses and huge compensation, and dividends. As 
concluded, to obtain private benefits through contractual 
policies among others by tunneling.
In addition, some implications to managements can 
be gained from this study. Especially for capital market 
regulators who could play a significant role in improving 
the practice of corporate governance and disclosures 
through more effective regulations, for potential investors 
who wish to improve their knowledge on corporate 
governance and RPTs, and for accountants and executives 
who have significant roles in enhancing the knowledge 
of companies in the areas of corporate governance and 
disclosures.
This study found empirical evidence that a related 
party transaction may be used as a tunnel for the transfer 
of resources out of the company’s controlling interest at 
the expense of minority shareholders. Being-tunneled 
company will decrease financial performance. These 
results are consistent with the phenomenon of the 
expropriation of minority shareholders are carried through 
contractual policies with related parties.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this study support that notion and found 
that the IDX listed companies with concentrated ownerships 
have a tendency to conduct tunneling transactions, 
compared to those companies with dispersed ownerships. 
Klapper and Love (2004) claimed that companies operating 
in countries with a low level of investor protection policies 
were likely to have lower corporate governance rankings. 
Therefore, companies that operate in countries with 
weak legal systems should rely more on good corporate 
governance as a counterweight mechanism. The overall 
result of this study indicates that the IDX listed companies 
have weak corporate governance mechanisms which were 
ineffective in preventing tunneling activities.
In addition, the overall result has also been suggested 
that a high quality of disclosures made by companies might 
help in protecting minority shareholders, especially in 
emerging economies, since it could make it more difficult 
for controlling shareholders to conduct expropriation 
(Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng 2009). In Indonesia, 
the level of compliance for mandatory disclosures made 
by listed companies on the IDX was still low (Khomsiyah 
2005). Disclosures made for RPTs were even less, and most 
of the disclosures were prepared in a minimal way. Hence 
they often did not clearly indicate value destroying RPTs, 
such as tunneling that had been made by the companies.
As always there are limitations that should be 
considered. First, the companies used in this study are 
listed companies on the IDX, and hence the generalization 
of the findings should be treated cautiously. Second, there 
are other corporate governance factors that have not been 
included in this study, and hence future work, using other 
variable sets is strongly recommended to explore further 
relationships among the variables.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A. TUNNELING DETECTION CRITERIA
 Criteria Literature background
There is a negative abnormal return 
around the announcement of a related 
party transaction.
It has been found that market participants reacted negatively to announcements of 
RPTs which have indications of tunneling (Bae et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; 
Cheung et al. 2009a; Facio and Stollin 2006; Peng et al. 2011). These studies have 
shown some evidence that minority shareholders experienced large value of losses 
after the announcements of such RPTs by publicly listed firms, which led to a 
suggestion of expropriation of minority shareholders.
There are indications that a 
transaction to related parties is made 
for tunneling purposes.
Berkman et al. (2009), Cheung et al. (2006), and Cheung et al. (2009b) found 
that asset transactions, cash payments, receivable transactions, loan guarantees, 
and trading transactions to related parties had high tendencies toward tunneling 
activities since they could be used by a company to tunnel resources out to its 
related parties through unfair pricing, and thus lowering the value of company at 
the expense of minority shareholders.
There are overlapping ownerships 
between a company and its related 
party.
Overlapping ownerships refer to similarities of controlling owners of a company 
and its related party. Overlapping ownerships could lead to opportunistic 
actions of transferring resources from a company to its related party (Goranova, 
2007). Accordingly, overlapping ownerships between a company’s controlling 
shareholders and its related party had high tendencies toward tunneling activities.
There are differences of cash flow 
rights of controlling shareholders in a 
company and its related party.
Earnings that flow from a company, in which the controlling shareholders have 
low cash-flow rights, to its related party, in which they hold high cash-flow rights, 
had high tendencies toward tunneling activities (Bertrand et al. 2002).
APPENDIX B. THE CONSTRUCT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN THE TUNNELING  
DETECTION (INITIAL) MODEL
 Variable Type Scale/Measure Description
Tunneling Dummy - 1 is assigned for a being-tunnelled company, 
i.e. a listed company on the IDX that has been 
identified to have an indication of performing 
tunneling activities;
- 0 is assigned for a not-tunnelled company, i.e. 
a listed company that has a ratio of RPTs which 
is less than the average ratio of RPTs performed 
by all listed companies on the IDX.
As per section Data Collection for 
both Tunneling Detection Criteria and 
Not-Tunnelled Detection Criteria.
Single 
Shareholder
Dummy - 1 is assigned if one shareholder controls at least 
50% of the total equity OR if one shareholder 
controls between 40% to 50% of the total equity 
and this ownership percentage is higher than the 
sum of the ownership percentages held by the 
second to the fifth largest shareholders;
- 0 is assigned if the ownership structure is 
different than those for scale 1.
To determine ownership 
concentrations, namely single 
shareholder or multiple shareholders, 
this study follows the approach of Gao 
and Kling (2008).
Variable 
Multiple
Dummy -  1 is assigned if the largest shareholder holds 
between 10 to 50% of the total equity, the 
second largest shareholder holds at least 10% of 
the equity, and the ownership percentage of the 
largest shareholder is smaller than the sum of 
the ownership percentages held by the second 
to the fifth largest shareholders;
-  0 is assigned if the ownership structure is 
different than those for scale 1.
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 Variable Type Scale/Measure Description
Independent 
Board
Dummy - 1 is assigned if the proportion of independent 
board members is at least 30% of the total 
number of board members;
- 0 is assigned otherwise.
IDX recommends that the proportion 
of independent board members 
is at least 30% of the total board 
members. Indonesia adopts a two-tier 
board system, where companies are 
required to have a supervisory board 
and an operational board. This study 
emphasises on the supervisory role of 
the board.
Audit 
Committee
Dummy - 1 is assigned if the composition of the audit 
committee is in accordance with the regulation;
- 0 is assigned otherwise.
Listed companies on the IDX are 
required to have an audit committee 
with at least three people, in which 
one of them should be an independent 
commissioner of the company and 
act as the chairman of the audit 
committee.
Managerial 
Ownership
Continuous Percentage of shares held by all members the 
Board of Directors.
Managerial ownership shows the 
portion of a company’s equity which is 
owned by its management board.
Foreign 
Institutional 
Ownership
Continuous Percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors.
Institutional ownership is defined to 
be the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors (foreign and 
domestic), which include insurance 
companies, pension funds, banks, 
mutual funds, and investment banks 
(Aggarwal et al. 2011; Jennings, 
2005).
Domestic 
Institutional 
Ownership
Continuous Percentage of shares held by foreign institutional 
investors.
State Ownership Dummy 1 is assigned if a company is ultimately owned by 
the state;
0 is assigned otherwise.
State ownership shows the ownership 
of a company by the Indonesian 
government.
ROA Continuous Net income to total Asset Return on Assets
PM Continuous Net income to sales Profit Margin
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APPENDIX C. DETAILED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON TUNNELING ACTIVITIES
 Being-tunnelled companies (N = 55) Not-tunnelled companies (N = 87)
Variable Mean Max Min Median SD  Mean Max Min Median SD
Single Shareholder (dummy) .744 1 0 1 .44 .507 1 0 1 .503
Multi Shareholders (dummy) .8511 1 0 1 .415 .704 1 0 1 .415
Independent Board (proportion) .0122 .40 .00 .004 .058 .0036 .01 .00 .0033 .002
Audit Committee (number) 2.10 5 1 3 1.6 2.26 5 0 3 1.48
Managerial Ownership (proportion)  .0547 .64 .00 .00 .16 .0212 .16 .00 .00 .04
Foreign Institutional Ownership (proportion) .289 .99 .00 .13 .34 .258 1.00 .00 .128 .305
Domestic Institutional Ownership (proportion) .361 .99 .00 .31 .37 .365 .81 .00 .39 .28
State Ownership (proportion) .5109 .80 .00 .00 .20 .065 .702 .00 .00 .19
Return on Assets .89 40.56 -.08 .07 5.6 7.19 31.98 .03 6.4 5.7
Profit Margin .06 .29 -.56 .006 .14 17.49 62.98 .01 13.08 1.4
Sources: Indonesia Stock Exchange 2009; 2010; 2011
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